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Introduction
The global …nancial crisis has reignited the debate on whether a central bank should pay special attention to asset prices and credit aggregates. Indeed, the benign neglect approach of the mid-2000s seems to have been debunked by what we know today of the by subsequent events. This opens the door to a leaningagainst-the-wind (LAW) approach to monetary policy-i.e., a policy where the policy stance is chosen to be tighter than the one justi…ed by the stabilization of in ‡ation and resource utilization (traditional central bank's goals) to limit the buildup of …nancial risks. Proponents of LAW argue that even though the policy rate may not be the best tool to deal with …nancial risks-especially when compared to micro-and macro-prudential tools-it has the advantage of In this paper, we assess the relative welfare bene…ts of LAW in Canada. At the current conjuncture Canada represents an interesting case: Monetary policy faces the dilemma of supporting a struggling economy by cutting interest rates and maintaining …nancial stability in a context of high household debt and ever growing housing prices (Figure 1 and 2 ).
The present paper contributes to the literature in various ways.
(1) It extends Schularick and Taylor's (2012) estimates of crisis probabilities and shows that adding debt (private debt-to-GDP) improves the empirical …t and brings additional insights: It has a non-linear e¤ect in that it is mainly at high levels of debt that higher credit growth a¤ects the crisis probability-a 1 percentage point increase in credit growth implies just a 0.02 percentage point increase in crisis probability when debt-to-GDP is low (e.g., 30 percent) but the crisis probability doubles when debt-to-GDP is high (e.g., 100 percent).
(2) It evaluates the central bank loss function dynamically using a two-state Markov chain that better captures the uncertainty of the state of the economy (normal vs. crisis state). 1 Finally, (3) it uses a Bayesian VAR (estimated on US and Canadian data) to assess the e¤ectiveness of the policy rate in driving macroeconomic variables taking into full account parameter uncertainty in the welfare comparison.
Our …ndings show that it is very unlikely that the bene…ts of having a meaningfully tighter policy (i.e., at least 25 basis points higher than otherwise) would outweigh its costs, in the current Canadian context. In fact, even though the interest rate increase reduces the growth of real household credit and house prices and the ratio of household debt to GDP, the reduction in the crisis probability is minor and peaks only after about 8 years. At the same time, costs are front loaded and magni…ed by the tighter economic conditions. The policy rate path which takes into account …nancial stability risks is, thus, only 6 basis points higher than otherwise (for 8 quarters)-which, quantitatively, is not a meaningful policy alternative. A policy rate that is 25 basis points higher than otherwise (for 8 quarters) is expected to be welfare improving only under a scenario where a crisis would impose severe costs on the economy and real credit is expected to grow (in absence of policy intervention) at or above 9 percent a year for the next 3 consecutive years.
Finally, a caveat: A speci…c analysis of the Canadian macroprudential framework and its possible interaction with monetary policy goes beyond the scope of the paper. It is, however, worth mentioning that the country-…xed e¤ects of the logit regression are not statistically signi…cant and, thus, not useful for improving our ability to understand whether di¤erences in institutional frame- 
Predicting Financial Crises
To quantitatively assess which factors a¤ect the probability of a crisis we follow Schularik and Taylor (2012) and postulate that in a given country the probability, p t , of observing a …nancial crisis in year t can be expressed as a logit function of a vector of observable variables
where is a vector of parameters and X t is the vector of observable variables.
To estimate we perform a regression using Schularick and Taylor's (2012) cross-country longitudinal dataset. 2 Estimates are shown in Table 1 . The …rst regression replicates their results where credit growth (i.e., the change in the log-real bank loans extended to households and non-…nancial corporate sector) a¤ects signi…cantly the crisis probability with a two year lag. We extend the …rst speci…cation by including debt-to-GDP. This speci…cation shows that not only the ‡ow of credit but also its cumulated stock is an important predictor of crises.
Moreover, we …nd a better …t when debt is introduced exponentially (both the pseudo likelihood and R-squared improve). This speci…cation does not reduce (it actually strengthens) the credit growth coe¢ cient suggesting that it is mainly By feeding Canadian data into the estimated regressions we can plot the probability of observing a …nancial crisis in Canada over time ( Figure 3 ): 4 In the last decade, the level of the crisis probability has shifted up because of rising household debt-a legacy of the housing boom of the 2000s. This can be easily seen by noting how the point estimates of the crisis probability start diverging in mid-2000s when debt is added to the speci…cation.
It is also worth noting that point estimates are characterized by high standard errors which introduce the risk of underplaying the possibility of a crisis when focusing only on point estimates. We will take into account parameter uncertainty and the role that it plays in our welfare comparisons.
The last regression of Table 1 introduces the one-year lagged real rate and its interaction with debt. Even though the direct e¤ect of a real rate increase would tend to reduce the crisis probability, the positive coe¢ cient on the interaction term implies that the benign e¤ects on the crisis probability of a real rate increase can be overturned by a high stock of debt. This result, though interesting, is not fully supported by the data given that coe¢ cients on both 3 Low and high level of debt are de…ned as the average Canadian household credit-to-GDP in 1983 (about 20 percent) and in 2015 (about 100 percent), respectively. Marginal e¤ects are de…ned as @p=@x i = i p(1 p), where p is the crisis probability evaluated in a given point.
For credit growth the marginal e¤ects are calculated summing all the 5 coe¢ cients on lagged credit growth. 4 To convert the estimates from annual to quarterly frequency we have used year over year changes and averages for credit growth and debt-to-GDP. The probabilities are then divided by 4.
5 the real rate and the interaction term are not statistically signi…cant.
The speci…cation with the addition of debt seems to be the most appealing not only theoretically but also in terms of …t since the value of its pseudo Rsquared is the highest among the three speci…cations. Hence we will use it as our baseline regression in the policy analysis of section 4.
3 The E¤ectiveness of the Interest Rate as a
Policy Instrument
In what follows we assume that the monetary authority has the short-term interest rate as the only instrument available to address its policy objectives.
Having found the factors that help predict …nancial crises, to establish the link between the policy instrument and policy objectives, we now turn to assess whether and by how much an interest rate shock a¤ects credit growth and household debt (i.e., intermediate target variables for the …nancial stability goal)
above and beyond its impact on in ‡ation and unemployment (i.e., traditional monetary policy goals).
To study the e¤ects of a policy rate shock we adopt a Bayesian VAR which includes US economic indicators and oil prices as exogenous variables in addition to (endogenous) Canadian economic indicators. 5 We …nd that a typical monetary policy shock increases the short-term interest rate by 50 basis points initially, with a half life of about 1.5 years ( Figure   4 ).
The BVAR is estimated from 1985Q1 to 2015Q2 and includes 3 lags. The exogenous or external block has tight priors that are independent of Canadian variables and includes the US unemployment rate, the 3-month US Tbill, and the log-di¤erence of WTI oil price, US real GDP, and CPI index. The Canadian block includes the unemployment rate, the short-term treasury yield, the log of credit-to-GDP, and the log-di¤erence of real GDP, CPI index NSA, CPIX index, real house prices, credit divided by CPI, and real exchange rate. Credit is de…ned as total credit extended to households by Bank of Canada. 6 A recursive identi…cation is used to identify the monetary policy shock by having the shortterm Canadian interest rate placed in the penultimate position before the real exchange rate.
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The e¤ect of the monetary policy shock on the traditional target variables are as follows. The peak impact of the shock on unemployment is about 0.2 percentage points after almost 4 years while real GDP growth drops below -0.2 percent after 3 quarters. The response of in ‡ation is relatively muted, the point estimate shows a mild price puzzle which is in part due to the increase in mortgage payments-which, in Canada, are still included in the shelter component of CPI. 7 Even so, eventually price in ‡ation falls below its long-term 2 percent target. 8 We now turn to the e¤ect of the monetary policy shock on credit. Both real credit growth and debt-to-GDP decline after an interest rate shock. Real credit declines by about 0.4 percentage points, peaking after 3 quarters. The reduction in real credit growth is strongly associated with a slowdown in real house prices. The reduction in debt-to-GDP is more modest and it peaks after 10 years (before reverting to its steady state level). After 10 years, the stock of debt is almost 1 percent lower than in the absence of the shock. 9 The historical decomposition of household debt and real credit growth shows that most of their movements in the last 5 years can be explained by external
The identi…cation scheme used follows closely the one used in the literature (see Christiano et al 1999 or Coibion 2012 for a discussion). 7 The muted price response has proven to be quite robust to changes in the BVAR speci…-cation and sample period (such as using GDP de ‡ator or SA CPI data on a shorter sample period). The price puzzle does not particularly a¤ect CPIX which excludes mortgage payments (among other items). It is also likely that the precision of the estimates of the impact of monetary policy shocks on prices is diminished by the well anchored medium-and long-term in ‡ation expectations. 8 We have imposed a tight prior on steady state in ‡ation symmetrically centered at 2 percent. 9 A clari…cation: The di¤erence between the cumulated response of real credit growth and real GDP growth is not exactly equal to the debt-to-GDP ratio because credit growth is de ‡ated by CPI while GDP is de ‡ated by the GDP de ‡ator. Also, the BVAR implicitely assumes that after a monetary policy shock the debt-to-GDP ratio converges back to steady state while the cumulated di¤erence between real credit growth and real GDP growth (i.e., real debt-over-real GDP) is not forced to converge to its steady state. These assumptions have no bearing on the results since, the rate of convergence to steady state of debt-to-GDP is extremely slow. In the next section we use the BVAR projections and the elasticities (IRFs)
of the endogenous variables to the monetary policy shock to determine the behavior of target variables, credit variables, and, thus, the crisis probability, during normal times.
Evaluating the Policy Tradeo¤s
To assess the policy alternatives we follow the methodology developed in Diaz- while the alternative path is chosen to be 'somewhat'tighter than the other one (the LAW-path). We will perform this exercise in the context of our BVAR drawing forecasts of the variable of interests conditional on the chosen interest rate path and taking into account parameter uncertainty.
It is worth noting that given the way interest rate paths are constructed-i.e., a set of monetary policy shocks are used to construct the conditional forecasts- 
The Loss Function
We de…ne the momentary loss function as
where t is the in ‡ation rate and u t is the unemployment rate (our chosen measure of economic activity).
The life-time welfare loss can, thus, be de…ned as
where 0 = fi t g T t=0 describes the chosen interest rate path and T is the policy horizon.
We assume that the economy follows a two-state Markov chain where the transition matrix M t governs the probabilities of passing from the normal state to the crisis state and vice versa. The time-t transition matrix is de…ned as
where p t represents the probability of going from the normal state to the crisis state while represents the probability of going back to the normal state from a crisis state. The functional form and estimation of p t has been performed already in section 2 while the notation p t ( 0 ) stresses that ultimately the probability of transition from the normal state to the crisis state depends on the chosen interest rate path since it a¤ects credit variables. The m-period-ahead transition probabilities M t;t+m can be expressed recursively as
Hence, assuming that we evaluate policy alternatives conditional on being in normal times, we can write our welfare loss as
where the expectation operator b E is understood to be de…ned on both shock and parameter uncertainty perceived by the monetary authority.
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As mentioned, during normal times the evolution of target variables comes from the BVAR conditional forecasts (see section 3 for a description of the BVAR). This seems to be a reasonable description of normal times since the BAVR has been estimated over a period where Canada experienced no …nancial crisis. The BVAR, however, is clearly no longer reliable to describe the evolution of our variables of interest during crisis times. For simplicity, we assume that during a crisis our traditional target variables (in ‡ation and output) are a constant above their target levels (see section Calibration).
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We de…ne the optimal policy that would prevail in the absence of …nancial stability consideration as a linear-quadratic (or benign-neglect) policy. This is simply derived as the optimization of L 0 ( 0 ) conditional on p t 0 at all times.
In the presence of …nancial stability considerations we have to take into account the transition matrices M t;t+m ( 0 ) which are indirectly a¤ected by the chosen path for the policy rate through its impact on credit variables.
The welfare comparison is thus the di¤erence between welfare losses under the linear quadratic path In the loss function comparison we abstract from shock uncertainty (i.e., in the BVAR projections we do not draw from the distribution of shocks). Preliminary calculations suggest that even though shock uncertainty has a signi…cant e¤ect on the level of losses, it is parameter uncertainty that matters for the welfare loss comparison of alternative policy paths. 1 1 Notice that our approach does not require imposing a constant in ‡ation and unemployment in crisis times; instead we assume that they follow a well-behaved stochastic process.
Calibration
Since 25 basis points is the smallest policy rate movement considered by most We set , the probability of reverting to normal times, to 0.06 which implies an average crisis duration of 4.2 years. This is in line with various empirical evidence that point to slow recoveries from …nancial crises.
To calibrate the cost of a crisis we assume that during a moderate crisis in ‡a-tion is 2 percentage points below its target while unemployment is 5 percentage points above its target for the entire duration of the crisis. Furthermore, in a severe crisis we assume that unemployment is 7 percentage points above the target (this is in line with IMF 2015).
It is worth stressing, however, that there are alternative ways of conceptualizing the costs of a crisis that have been proposed in the literature: (1) In a crisis the unemployment (in ‡ation) rate increases (decreases) relative to its last pre-crisis observation rather than the natural target rate (Svensson 2016) ; (2) the increase (decrease) in the unemployment (in ‡ation) rate is proportional to the pre-crisis credit growth rather than being a …xed magnitude (BIS 2014 and IMF 2015).
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Alternative (1) has built-in a leaning-with-the-wind e¤ect. Since a LAW policy increases the unemployment rate during normal times relative to the benign-neglect policy, when a crisis occurs, the unemployment rate will necessarily be starting at a level higher than if the authorities have not implemented a LAW policy. Loosely speaking, approach (1) assumes that LAW makes the cost of crises more severe (even though less likely). 14 This pushes the bar higher for a leaning-against-the-wind policy.
Alternative (2), on the other hand, favors to lean against the wind since it assume that the higher the credit growth is the more severe the next crisis will be. This implies that leaning against the wind not only may prevent crises from happening but also, when they do happen, they will be less severe. This approach clearly lowers the bar for a leaning-against-the-wind policy. 15 Overall, we believe that our chosen calibration for the cost of a crisis strikes a balance between the two alternatives described above.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the Canadian mortgage sector has an extended government guarantee for mortgages insured through the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) a crown corporation, and a 90 percent Federal guarantee on the mortgage insurance provided by two private insurers.
It is, thus, plausible to assume that the costs of a …nancial crisis would be mitigated by the Federal government guarantee. However, an explicit government intervention does not necessarily isolate the broader real sector from …nancial turmoil-as the experience of the Nordic countries in the '90s and more recently Ireland would suggest. 16 We will, thus, assume a moderate cost of a crisis under our baseline case and explore the case of a severe crisis only in a scenario.
Result 1. The baseline case
The welfare comparison suggests that it is very unlikely that a LAW policy would be bene…cial in Canada under current circumstances ( Figure 6 ). 17 In other words, even though household debt is high and credit grew at a brisk pace recently, the additional slowdown in real economic activity induced by LAW would be too costly. The increase in the average welfare loss due to LAW is about 0.39 percent (relative to the benign-neglect policy). In the speci…cation without debt the relative loss due to LAW increases to about 0.56 percent. It is worth noting, however, that parameter uncertainty is substantial. Indeed, the histogram of Figure 6 shows a few draws from the parameter space where the losses under the benign-neglect policy are bigger,
). These draws re ‡ect a combination of parameters where unemployment and in ‡ation are little a¤ected by monetary policy shocks while the crisis probability is at the highest percentiles of its estimated distribution.
To understand the results it is also worth emphasizing that the bene…ts of LAW are mostly accrued slowly over time in terms of lower crisis probability with a peak e¤ect after almost 8 years. Costs, instead, are clearly paid upfront in the …rst 2 years of tighter policy ( Figure 7 ). 18 1 6 In addition, government guarantees has the drawback of inducing moral hazard in the …nancial sector which may increase risk-taking and raise the probability of a crisis, ceteris paribus. 1 7 Recall that the LAW policy considered is a policy rate path 25 basis points higher than otherwise, LAW 0 = LQ 0 + 0:25, for 8 quarters. 1 8 The starting value for the unemployment rate is ut = 6:8 and is projected to rise to 7:0 13 4.1.3 Result 2. The optimal response is 6 basis points!
In the previous section we assumed that the LAW path was 25 basis points higher than otherwise. Since 25 basis points is an arbitrary choice we searched for the optimal deviation from the benign-neglect policy once we introduce …nancial stability considerations in the loss function (still maintaining the restriction of 8 quarters policy horizon to test LAW). So among all the alternative policy paths that di¤er from the LQ path by x basis points,
searched for the one that delivers the lowest welfare loss. We found that the policy path that gives the lowest welfare loss (under our preferred calibration) is only 6 basis points higher than the LQ path. In other words, to take account of …nancial stability concerns, the policy rate should be a mere 6 basis points higher, improving welfare by only 0.02 percent relative to the taditional benignneglect policy (Figure 8 ).
The intuition is simple. The momentary loss function is quadratic in in ‡a-tion and unemployment (conditional on being in normal times) which means that very small deviations of in ‡ation and unemployment from their targets are inconsequential for the welfare loss ( Figure 9 ). 19 Indeed, in the limit, the marginal costs of increasing the policy rate are zero when in ‡ation and unemployment are exactly at their targets. The marginal bene…ts of a higher policy rate, however, are always strictly positive since the e¤ect of a higher policy rate on the crisis probability is always strictly positive-except in the uninteresting limit case when the crisis probability is exactly zero. So in principle it is always possible to …nd a su¢ ciently small policy rate increase for which its marginal bene…ts are strictly greater than its marginal costs. What we found, however, is that the policy rate increase that eventually equates marginal bene…ts with marginal costs is just 6 basis points higher than otherwise-which is of little quantitative relevance.
in the next quarter, while CPI in ‡ation is projected to fall below the 2 percent target in the following 2 quarters under the LQ policy. 1 9 The LQ path usually guarantees that in ‡ation and unemployment stay close to their targets.
Result 3. A high-credit-growth and severe crisis scenario
Given the sizeable terms of trade shock coupled with weak economic conditions the BVAR is currently projecting a slowdown in credit growth in the forthcoming years. This projection, though reasonable, clearly has a bearing on the results. Credit growth, however, is strong in buoyant housing markets such as Vancouver and Toronto. It is, thus, interesting to construct a scenario with higher credit growth and where the costs of a crisis are potentially severe rather than moderate. This exercise will help us understand the sensitivity of the previous results to di¤erent initial conditions and assumptions. Under this scenario not only are the bene…ts of LAW increased because of the potential severity of the crisis but also-since marginal e¤ects are increasing in the crisis predictors-higher real rates have a stronger e¤ect on reducing the crisis probability (see Figure 11 ). It is useful to describe the results in terms of a credit growth threshold above which leaning against the wind becomes bene…cial. We …nd that when real credit growth exceeds 9.1 percent the bene…ts of a LAW policy (i.e., a policy rate 25 basis points higher than otherwise for 8 quarters)
outweigh their costs (see Figure 10 ).
Conclusion
The recent monetary policy debate has reignited the question of whether a central bank should tighten monetary policy to reduce …nancial stability risks.
We have attempted to answer this question for Canada and, under current conditions, the answer is most likely no.
Our analysis has also shown how initial conditions (in relation to credit aggregates and other macroeconomic variables), non-linearities in the relation between the crisis probability and its determinants, and long lags and parameter uncertainty play a substantial role in the comparison of policy alternatives. In particular, we have shown that (1) the level of debt interacts with credit growth: the higher the debt level the stronger the marginal e¤ect of credit growth on the crisis probability, (2) a monetary policy shock a¤ects the crisis probability with long lags (the peak e¤ect is after 8 years), but (3) 
